Volume 1, Issue 4
Incentive Effects of Multiple-Server Queueing Networks: The Principal-Agent Perspective

Sin-Man Choi, Ximin Huang, Wai-Ki Ching & Min Huang

East Asian J. Appl. Math., 1 (2011), pp. 379-402.

Published online: 2018-02

Export citation
  • Abstract

A two-server service network has been studied from the principal-agent perspective. In the model, services are rendered by two independent facilities coordinated by an agency, which seeks to devise a strategy to suitably allocate customers to the facilities and to simultaneously determine compensation levels. Two possible allocation schemes were compared — viz. the common queue and separate queue schemes. The separate queue allocation scheme was shown to give more competition incentives to the independent facilities and to also induce higher service capacity. In this paper, we investigate the general case of a multiple-server queueing model, and again find that the separate queue allocation scheme creates more competition incentives for servers and induces higher service capacities. In particular, if there are no severe diseconomies associated with increasing service capacity, it gives a lower expected sojourn time in equilibrium when the compensation level is sufficiently high.

  • Keywords

Capacity allocation, competition, incentive theory, Markovian queueing systems, Nash equilibrium, principal agent.

  • AMS Subject Headings

60K25, 68M20, 91A80

  • Copyright

COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press

  • Email address
  • BibTex
  • RIS
  • TXT
@Article{EAJAM-1-379, author = {}, title = {Incentive Effects of Multiple-Server Queueing Networks: The Principal-Agent Perspective}, journal = {East Asian Journal on Applied Mathematics}, year = {2018}, volume = {1}, number = {4}, pages = {379--402}, abstract = {

A two-server service network has been studied from the principal-agent perspective. In the model, services are rendered by two independent facilities coordinated by an agency, which seeks to devise a strategy to suitably allocate customers to the facilities and to simultaneously determine compensation levels. Two possible allocation schemes were compared — viz. the common queue and separate queue schemes. The separate queue allocation scheme was shown to give more competition incentives to the independent facilities and to also induce higher service capacity. In this paper, we investigate the general case of a multiple-server queueing model, and again find that the separate queue allocation scheme creates more competition incentives for servers and induces higher service capacities. In particular, if there are no severe diseconomies associated with increasing service capacity, it gives a lower expected sojourn time in equilibrium when the compensation level is sufficiently high.

}, issn = {2079-7370}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4208/eajam.231010.260711a}, url = {http://global-sci.org/intro/article_detail/eajam/10911.html} }
TY - JOUR T1 - Incentive Effects of Multiple-Server Queueing Networks: The Principal-Agent Perspective JO - East Asian Journal on Applied Mathematics VL - 4 SP - 379 EP - 402 PY - 2018 DA - 2018/02 SN - 1 DO - http://doi.org/10.4208/eajam.231010.260711a UR - https://global-sci.org/intro/article_detail/eajam/10911.html KW - Capacity allocation, competition, incentive theory, Markovian queueing systems, Nash equilibrium, principal agent. AB -

A two-server service network has been studied from the principal-agent perspective. In the model, services are rendered by two independent facilities coordinated by an agency, which seeks to devise a strategy to suitably allocate customers to the facilities and to simultaneously determine compensation levels. Two possible allocation schemes were compared — viz. the common queue and separate queue schemes. The separate queue allocation scheme was shown to give more competition incentives to the independent facilities and to also induce higher service capacity. In this paper, we investigate the general case of a multiple-server queueing model, and again find that the separate queue allocation scheme creates more competition incentives for servers and induces higher service capacities. In particular, if there are no severe diseconomies associated with increasing service capacity, it gives a lower expected sojourn time in equilibrium when the compensation level is sufficiently high.

Sin-Man Choi, Ximin Huang, Wai-Ki Ching & Min Huang. (1970). Incentive Effects of Multiple-Server Queueing Networks: The Principal-Agent Perspective. East Asian Journal on Applied Mathematics. 1 (4). 379-402. doi:10.4208/eajam.231010.260711a
Copy to clipboard
The citation has been copied to your clipboard